Explore your experimental designs and theories before you exploit them!

In many areas of the social and behavioral sciences, the nature of the experiments and theories that best capture the underlying constructs are themselves areas of active inquiry. Integrative experiment design risks being prematurely exploitative, hindering exploration of experimental paradigms and of diverse theoretical accounts for target phenomena.

Task performance errors and rewards affect voluntary task choices.

Humans are remarkably flexible in adapting their behavior to current demands. It has been suggested that the decision which of multiple tasks to perform is based on a variety of factors pertaining to the rewards associated with each task as well as task performance (e.g., error rates associated with each task and/or error commission on the previous trial). However, further empirical investigation is needed to examine whether task performance still influences task choices if task choices are rewarded but task performance is not. Accordingly, we exposed participants to a novel reward-varying voluntary task switching paradigm where the reward for the performed task gradually decreased while the reward associated for the alternative task was unchanged. Importantly, we rewarded participants' task choices before participants performed the task to investigate the effect of rewards independent from task performance. We examined the effect of (i) reward, (ii) error rates associated with each of the two tasks, and (iii) error commission in the previous trial on voluntary task choices. As expected, we found that participants' task selection was influenced by reward differences between task choices. In addition, error rates associated with a task also influenced task selection, with participants requiring larger reward differences to switch to a task associated with relatively higher error rates, compared to switching to a task with relatively lower error rates. However, errors in n - 1 did not influence participants' probability to switch to the alternative task. These findings contribute to an ongoing discussion on the influence of task performance on task selection.

Control adjustment costs limit goal flexibility: Empirical evidence and a theoretical account.

The ability to switch between goals is the cornerstone of human cognition and behavior. Cognitive control allows for rapid adjustments of cognition in accordance with new goals, but control adjustments come at a cost. This cost is traditionally studied in situations that demand changes to one's task, without necessitating other changes in the control state. Goal flexibility, however, often entails maintaining the same task while adjusting the amount and type of control being allocated to that task. For instance, different stages of a given task might require us to process information more or less efficiently (e.g., by varying levels of attention) and/or respond more or less cautiously (e.g., by varying response thresholds). Across four experiments, we show that such within-task control adjustments incur a performance cost, and that a dynamical systems model can explain the source of these costs. Participants performed a single cognitively demanding task (the color-word Stroop) under varying performance goals (e.g., to be fast or to be accurate). We modeled control allocation to include a dynamic process of adjusting from one's current control state to a target state for a given performance goal. By incorporating inertia into this adjustment process, our model predicts and our empirical findings confirm that people will under-shoot their target control state more (i.e., exhibit larger adjustment costs) when (a) goals switch rather than remain fixed over a block (Study 1); (b) target control states are more distant from one another (Study 2); (c) less time is given to adjust to the new goal (Study 3); and (d) when anticipating having to switch goals more frequently (Study 4). Our findings demonstrate that there is a cost to adjusting control to meet one's goal - even in the absence of a task change - and show that this cost can emerge directly from the dynamics of control adjustment. In so doing, they shed new light on the sources of and constraints on flexibility in human goal-directed behavior.

Assignment strategies modulate students' academic performance in an online learning environment during the first and second COVID-19 related school closures.

A growing number of studies seek to evaluate the impact of school closures during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. While most studies reported severe learning losses in students, some studies found positive effects of school closures on academic performance. However, it is still unclear which factors contribute to the differential effects observed in these studies. In this article, we examine the impact of assignment strategies for problem sets on the academic performance of students (n ≈ 16,000 from grades 4-10 who calculated ≈ 170,000 problem sets) in an online learning environment for mathematics, during the first and second period of pandemic-related school closures in Germany. We observed that, if teachers repeatedly assigned single problem sets (i.e., a small chunk of on average eight mathematical problems) to their class, students' performance increased significantly during both periods of school closures compared to the same periods in the previous year (without school closures). In contrast, our analyses also indicated that, if teachers assigned bundles of problem sets (i.e., large chunks) or when students self-selected problem sets, students' performance did not increase significantly. Moreover, students' performance was generally higher when single problem sets were assigned, compared to the other two assignment types. Taken together, our results imply that teachers' way of assigning problem sets in online learning environments can have a positive effect on students' performance in mathematics.

Pushing the Bounds of Bounded Optimality and Rationality.

All forms of cognition, whether natural or artificial, are subject to constraints of their computing architecture. This assumption forms the tenet of virtually all general theories of cognition, including those deriving from bounded optimality and bounded rationality. In this letter, we highlight an unresolved puzzle related to this premise: what are these constraints, and why are cognitive architectures subject to cognitive constraints in the first place? First, we lay out some pieces along the puzzle edge, such as computational tradeoffs inherent to neural architectures that give rise to rational bounds of cognition. We then outline critical next steps for characterizing cognitive bounds, proposing that some of these bounds can be subject to modification by cognition and, as such, are part of what is being optimized when cognitive agents decide how to allocate cognitive resources. We conclude that these emerging views may contribute to a more holistic perspective on the nature of cognitive bounds, as well as their alteration subject to cognition.

An integrative effort: Bridging motivational intensity theory and recent neurocomputational and neuronal models of effort and control allocation.

An increasing number of cognitive, neurobiological, and computational models have been proposed in the last decade, seeking to explain how humans allocate physical or cognitive effort. Most models share conceptual similarities with motivational intensity theory (MIT), an influential classic psychological theory of motivation. Yet, little effort has been made to integrate such models, which remain confined within the explanatory level for which they were developed, that is, psychological, computational, neurobiological, and neuronal. In this critical review, we derive novel analyses of three recent computational and neuronal models of effort allocation-the expected value of control theory, the reinforcement meta-learner (RML) model, and the neuronal model of attentional effort-and establish a formal relationship between these models and MIT. Our analyses reveal striking similarities between predictions made by these models, with a shared key tenet: a nonmonotonic relationship between perceived task difficulty and effort, following a sawtooth or inverted U shape. In addition, the models converge on the proposition that the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex may be responsible for determining the allocation of effort and cognitive control. We conclude by discussing the distinct contributions and strengths of each theory toward understanding neurocomputational processes of effort allocation. Finally, we highlight the necessity for a unified understanding of effort allocation, by drawing novel connections between different theorizing of adaptive effort allocation as described by the presented models. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

A Benchmark for Compositional Visual Reasoning.

A fundamental component of human vision is our ability to parse complex visual scenes and judge the relations between their constituent objects. AI benchmarks for visual reasoning have driven rapid progress in recent years with state-of-the-art systems now reaching human accuracy on some of these benchmarks. Yet, there remains a major gap between humans and AI systems in terms of the sample efficiency with which they learn new visual reasoning tasks. Humans' remarkable efficiency at learning has been at least partially attributed to their ability to harness compositionality - allowing them to efficiently take advantage of previously gained knowledge when learning new tasks. Here, we introduce a novel visual reasoning benchmark, Compositional Visual Relations (CVR), to drive progress towards the development of more data-efficient learning algorithms. We take inspiration from fluid intelligence and non-verbal reasoning tests and describe a novel method for creating compositions of abstract rules and generating image datasets corresponding to these rules at scale. Our proposed benchmark includes measures of sample efficiency, generalization, compositionality, and transfer across task rules. We systematically evaluate modern neural architectures and find that convolutional architectures surpass transformer-based architectures across all performance measures in most data regimes. However, all computational models are much less data efficient than humans, even after learning informative visual representations using self-supervision. Overall, we hope our challenge will spur interest in developing neural architectures that can learn to harness compositionality for more efficient learning.

SweetPea: A standard language for factorial experimental design.

Experimental design is a key ingredient of reproducible empirical research. Yet, given the increasing complexity of experimental designs, researchers often struggle to implement ones that allow them to measure their variables of interest without confounds. SweetPea ( https://sweetpea-org.github.io/ ) is an open-source declarative language in Python, in which researchers can describe their desired experiment as a set of factors and constraints. The language leverages advances in areas of computer science to sample experiment sequences in an unbiased way. In this article, we provide an overview of SweetPea's capabilities, and demonstrate its application to the design of psychological experiments. Finally, we discuss current limitations of SweetPea, as well as potential applications to other domains of empirical research, such as neuroscience and machine learning.

Rationalizing constraints on the capacity for cognitive control.

Humans are remarkably limited in: (i) how many control-dependent tasks they can execute simultaneously, and (ii) how intensely they can focus on a single task. These limitations are universal assumptions of most theories of cognition. Yet, a rationale for why humans are subject to these constraints remains elusive. This feature review draws on recent insights from psychology, neuroscience, and machine learning, to suggest that constraints on cognitive control may result from a rational adaptation to fundamental, computational dilemmas in neural architectures. The reviewed literature implies that limitations in multitasking may result from a trade-off between learning efficacy and processing efficiency and that limitations in the intensity of commitment to a single task may reflect a trade-off between cognitive stability and flexibility.

Academic performance of K-12 students in an online-learning environment for mathematics increased during the shutdown of schools in wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The shutdown of schools in response to the rapid spread of COVID-19 poses risks to the education of young children, including a widening education gap. In the present article, we investigate how school closures in 2020 influenced the performance of German students in a curriculum-based online learning software for mathematics. We analyzed data from more than 2,500 K-12 students who computed over 124,000 mathematical problem sets before and during the shutdown, and found that students' performance increased during the shutdown of schools in 2020 relative to the year before. Our analyses also revealed that low-achieving students showed greater improvements in performance than high-achieving students, suggesting a narrowing gap in performance between low- and high-achieving students. We conclude that online learning environments may be effective in preventing educational losses associated with current and future shutdowns of schools.

Meta-control: From psychology to computational neuroscience.

Research in the past decades shed light on the different mechanisms that underlie our capacity for cognitive control. However, the meta-level processes that regulate cognitive control itself remain poorly understood. Following the terminology from artificial intelligence, meta-control can be defined as a collection of mechanisms that (a) monitor the progress of controlled processing and (b) regulate the underlying control parameters in the service of current task goals and in response to internal or external constraints. From a psychological perspective, meta-control is an important concept because it may help explain and predict how and when human agents select different types of behavioral strategies. From a cognitive neuroscience viewpoint, meta-control is a useful concept for understanding the complex networks in the prefrontal cortex that guide higher-level behavior as well as their interactions with neuromodulatory systems (such as the dopamine or norepinephrine system). The purpose of the special issue is to integrate hitherto segregated strands of research across three different perspectives: 1) a psychological perspective that specifies meta-control processes on a functional level and aims to operationalize them in experimental tasks; 2) a computational perspective that builds on ideas from artificial intelligence to formalize normative solutions to meta-control problems; and 3) a cognitive neuroscience perspective that identifies neural correlates of and mechanisms underlying meta-control.

Learning to Overexert Cognitive Control in a Stroop Task.

How do people learn when to allocate how much cognitive control to which task? According to the Learned Value of Control (LVOC) model, people learn to predict the value of alternative control allocations from features of a situation. This suggests that people may generalize the value of control learned in one situation to others with shared features, even when demands for control are different. This makes the intriguing prediction that what a person learned in one setting could cause them to misestimate the need for, and potentially overexert, control in another setting, even if this harms their performance. To test this prediction, we had participants perform a novel variant of the Stroop task in which, on each trial, they could choose to either name the color (more control-demanding) or read the word (more automatic). Only one of these tasks was rewarded each trial and could be predicted by one or more stimulus features (the color and/or word). Participants first learned colors and then words that predicted the rewarded task. Then, we tested how these learned feature associations transferred to novel stimuli with some overlapping features. The stimulus-task-reward associations were designed so that for certain combinations of stimuli, transfer of learned feature associations would incorrectly predict that more highly rewarded task would be color-naming, even though the actually rewarded task was word-reading and therefore did not require engaging control. Our results demonstrated that participants overexerted control for these stimuli, providing support for the feature-based learning mechanism described by the LVOC model.

A computational perspective on the roles of affect in cognitive control.

Previous work has demonstrated that cognitive control can be influenced by affect, both when it is tied to the anticipated outcomes for cognitive performance (integral affect) and when affect is induced independently of performance (incidental affect). However, the mechanisms through which such interactions occur remain debated, in part because they have yet to be formalized in a way that allows experimenters to test quantitative predictions of a putative mechanism. To generate such predictions, we leveraged a recent model that determines cognitive control allocation by weighing potential costs and benefits in order to determine the overall Expected Value of Control (EVC). We simulated potential accounts of how integral and incidental affect might influence this valuation process, including whether incidental positive affect influences how difficult one perceives a task to be, how effortful it feels to exert control, and/or the marginal utility of succeeding at the task. We find that each of these accounts makes dissociable predictions regarding affect's influence on control allocation and measures of task performance (e.g., conflict adaptation, switch costs). We discuss these findings in light of the existing empirical findings and theoretical models. Collectively, this work grounds existing theories regarding affect-control interactions, and provides a method by which specific predictions of such accounts can be confirmed or refuted based on empirical data.

Motivation and cognitive control in depression.

Depression is linked to deficits in cognitive control and a host of other cognitive impairments arise as a consequence of these deficits. Despite of their important role in depression, there are no mechanistic models of cognitive control deficits in depression. In this paper we propose how these deficits can emerge from the interaction between motivational and cognitive processes. We review depression-related impairments in key components of motivation along with new cognitive neuroscience models that focus on the role of motivation in the decision-making about cognitive control allocation. Based on this review we propose a unifying framework which connects motivational and cognitive control deficits in depression. This framework is rooted in computational models of cognitive control and offers a mechanistic understanding of cognitive control deficits in depression.

Dissociable neural mechanisms track evidence accumulation for selection of attention versus action.

Decision-making is typically studied as a sequential process from the selection of what to attend (e.g., between possible tasks, stimuli, or stimulus attributes) to which actions to take based on the attended information. However, people often process information across these various levels in parallel. Here we scan participants while they simultaneously weigh how much to attend to two dynamic stimulus attributes and what response to give. Regions of the prefrontal cortex track information about the stimulus attributes in dissociable ways, related to either the predicted reward (ventromedial prefrontal cortex) or the degree to which that attribute is being attended (dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, dACC). Within the dACC, adjacent regions track correlates of uncertainty at different levels of the decision, regarding what to attend versus how to respond. These findings bridge research on perceptual and value-based decision-making, demonstrating that people dynamically integrate information in parallel across different levels of decision-making.

Rational metareasoning and the plasticity of cognitive control.

The human brain has the impressive capacity to adapt how it processes information to high-level goals. While it is known that these cognitive control skills are malleable and can be improved through training, the underlying plasticity mechanisms are not well understood. Here, we develop and evaluate a model of how people learn when to exert cognitive control, which controlled process to use, and how much effort to exert. We derive this model from a general theory according to which the function of cognitive control is to select and configure neural pathways so as to make optimal use of finite time and limited computational resources. The central idea of our Learned Value of Control model is that people use reinforcement learning to predict the value of candidate control signals of different types and intensities based on stimulus features. This model correctly predicts the learning and transfer effects underlying the adaptive control-demanding behavior observed in an experiment on visual attention and four experiments on interference control in Stroop and Flanker paradigms. Moreover, our model explained these findings significantly better than an associative learning model and a Win-Stay Lose-Shift model. Our findings elucidate how learning and experience might shape people's ability and propensity to adaptively control their minds and behavior. We conclude by predicting under which circumstances these learning mechanisms might lead to self-control failure.

Toward a Rational and Mechanistic Account of Mental Effort.

In spite of its familiar phenomenology, the mechanistic basis for mental effort remains poorly understood. Although most researchers agree that mental effort is aversive and stems from limitations in our capacity to exercise cognitive control, it is unclear what gives rise to those limitations and why they result in an experience of control as costly. The presence of these control costs also raises further questions regarding how best to allocate mental effort to minimize those costs and maximize the attendant benefits. This review explores recent advances in computational modeling and empirical research aimed at addressing these questions at the level of psychological process and neural mechanism, examining both the limitations to mental effort exertion and how we manage those limited cognitive resources. We conclude by identifying remaining challenges for theoretical accounts of mental effort as well as possible applications of the available findings to understanding the causes of and potential solutions for apparent failures to exert the mental effort required of us.